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CANADIAN MILL PRODUCTS AND PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRiES
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to estimate a model incorporating nonconipetitive
behaviour in product and factor markets. In addition, capital accumulation is subject to
adjustment costs so thatf'mnsaxe not constrained to be in long-run equilibrium.
The model is applied to two major Canadian manufacturing industries: pulp and paper
and mill products. The results show for both industries in each of the three product markets
and the wood input market that there is competitive behaviour. In addition, the industries are
not in long-run equilibrium as marginal adjustment costs cause marginal profit to exceed the
rental rate on capitaL
With the industries exhibiting short-run competitive behaviour in product and factor
markets, new estimates are derived for scale economies and rates of technological change.
Unlike the results from other studies, both industries exhibit small scale economies and







Canadianindustries tend to be more concentrated than similar
industries in other countries (see Green (19851). This can resuLt in prices
exceeding marginal costs in product markets. In addition, andespeciallyfor
industries that use specific inputs, concentration can aLso result in
marginal revenue products exceeding prices in factor markets. The first
purpose of this paper is to deveLop and estimate a model incorporating non-
competitive behaviour in product and factor markets. The model is applied to
the Canadian milL products and pulp and paper industries.These two
industries are selected because together they constitute the largest Canadian
manufacturing industries (wood and paper and alLied products account for 4.5%
of shipments and 2.7% of emptoyment in 1987). Hence there is the possibility
of price-cost margins in their product markets. The two industries are also
the major users of Canadian forests, which represent a significant natural
resource in the economy.Thus it is feasible that the marginal revenue
product can exceed the factor price for the wood input in the mill products
and pulp and paper industries.
The approach adopted in this paper to model non-competitive behaviour
In product and factor markets is based on duality theory (see Diewert
(1982]).The significance of the dual approach is that both product and
factor decisions are simultaneously modelled. Thus, non-competitive
behaviour in product markets affects factor demand decisions, while
conversely, non-competitive behaviour in factor markets affects product
supply decisions.Geroski (19881 and Bresnahan [1989] provide excellent
surveys of the empirical approaches to analysing price-cost differentials in
product markets. Most applications of the dual approach to non-competitive
behaviour have focused on product markets. Appelbaun [1979] for U.S. crude
petroteun and natural gas industry, Appelbaum and KohLi (1979] for the
Canadian manufacturing sector, AppeLbaua (1982] for U.s. rubber, textiles,
electrical and tobacco industries, Roberts (1984] for U.S. coffee roasting2
firms, Morrison [1989] 'for U.S., Canadian and Japanese manufacturing sectors,
and Bernstein and Mohnen (1991] for Canadian chemical, electrical and
nonelectricat machinery industries. In this paper non-competitive behaviour
is parameterized using duality theory for both product and factor markets.
In previous studies of non-competitive pricing, production is assumed
to occur in either short or Long-run equilibrium.1 Assumptions regarding the
characterization of equilibrium are important for the investigation of non-
competitive pricing.It is possible to wrongly infer that market power
exists in a situation where product prices are above apparent Long-run
marginal costs. Adjustment costs associated with changes in short-run fixed
factors (in other words, quasi-fixed factors) cause short-run marginal Costs
to exceed long-run marginal costs. It is then possible for product prices to
equal short-run marginaL costs. Firms behave competitively in the short-run
as they adjust towards a Long-run equilibrium. Thus it is important to
account for firm adjustment in order to assess the existence of non-
competitive behaviour.
There is a growing body of evidence suggesting thet capital
accumulation is subject to adjustment costs (see Morrison and Berndt (1981],
Epstein and Yatchew (1985], Mohnen, Nadiri and Prucha [1986), Bernstein and
Nadiri [1989]). Firms that incur adjustment costs are unable to costlessly
attain Long-runequilibrium.Firms adjust toward the Long-run through
successive short-run equilibria. Indeed, at the margin, adjustment costs
characterize the deviation between short and long-run equilibrii.sn. In this
paper non-competitive pricing behaviour is modelled when firms incur
adjustment costs. Won-competitive behaviour can occur in either short or
long-run equilibriun.
Adjustment costs are an intrinsic part of firm technology.
Consequently their existence can affect the degree of scale economies and the
rate of technological change undertaken by firms. Moreover, scale economies3
and technoLogical change are not invariant to the levels of output supply and
input demand.Thus because non-competitive pricing affects equiLibriun
quantities in product and factor markets, observed degrees of scaLe economies
and rates of technoLogical change are influenced by deviations from
competitive behaviour. In this paper the degree of scale economies and rate
of technological change ore measured within the context of non-competitive
pricing in product and factor markets and capital adjustment costs.
The paper is organized into sections.Section 2 contaIns the
development of the theoretical model. Section 3 details the estimation model
and results regarding non-competitive pricing and adjustment costs. Section
4 Investigates the degree of scale economies and rate of technological
change. The last section of the paper is the conclusion.
2. The ModeL
In general a firm's production technoLogy can be represented as
(1) T(y(t),K(t—1),v(t),I(t),A(t)) 0
where T is a transformation function, y is an L-dimensional vector of
outputs, K is an n-dimensionaL vector of capital inputs, v is an n-
dimensional vector of variable inputs (such as labor and materials), I is the
vector of additions to the capital inputs, and A is an indicator of the level
oftechnology.T is twice continuousLy differentiable, increasing and
concave in y and I, and decreasing and convex in K and v. Since the
production process is defined over I, the gross investment vector, then there
are adjustment costs associated with expanding capital Inputs. These costs
are internal to the production process and are manifested by the foregone
output when resources are diverted from output production to capital
expansion, (see Lucas [1967], Treadway (19711 and Epstein [1982)).4
The accumuLation of the capital stocks is governed by
(2) K(t) 1(t) + - £)K(t-1)
where Im5 the rn-dimensionaL identity matrix andi is the diagonal matrix
of exogenous depreciation rates.2
Production decisions are determined by the maximization of the
expected present vaLue of the flow of funds. This present value is given by
(3) J(t)E_tE(t)a(t.,s)[PT(s)ycs)- WT(s)v(s) -
whereE Is the expectations operator conditional on information known in
period t, P is the vector of product prices, It is the vector ofvariable
inputprices, aisthe vector of capital purchase prices. The superscript I
represents vector transposition.
Production and investment decisions can be determined in two stages.
The first stage reLates to the short-run equilibrium in the product and
variabLe factor markets. In this stage variable profit, which isdenotedby
(4) [v pTy uTv,
is maximized subject to the production technology (equation (1)) and
conditional on the level and additions to the capital stocks.3 In this model
firms are not assumed to be price-takers In product and variable factor
markets. Price-setting ability is introduced through product and variable
factor shadow (or marginal) prices.5
(5.1)P6 =PCI,tI')
(5.2) = + 8)
whereI andtareidentity matrixes of dimension t and n, r<0 is a diagonal
matrix of product price-marginal revenue proportions, 8>0 is a diagonal
matrix of variable factor price -marginaLfactor cost proportions. The
elementsof rdepend on product demand functions and interdependenciesamong
productsuppliers, in particular, the elements of rrelateto the inverse
price elasticities of product demand and the conjectural elasticities of firm
interdependence in product markets. The elements of 8 depend on variable
factor supply functions and interdependencies among variable factor
demanders.Specifically the elements of 8 pertain to the inverse price
elasticities of variable factor supply and the conjectural elasticities of
firm interdependence in factor markets.
Diewert (1982) rigorously established that when r and S are matrices
of exogeneous variables a monopoList (or monopsonist) in short-run (or long-
run) equilibriwn can be viewed as undertaking production decisions according
to the maximization of variable profit evaluated at the prices given by
equatIon (5). In this case the elements of r and 8 relate respectively to
the exogeneousinverse price elasticities of product demand and variable
factor supply. The Diewert result was extended to an oligopolistic framework
by Roberts (19&4). In this context the elements of F relate to the inverse
price elasticities of product demand and the conjectural elasticities of firm
interdependence in product markets.5 Diewert and Roberts refer to prices
defined by equation set (5) as shadow prices and the variable profit
evaluated at these prices as shadow variable profit.6
Maximizing shadow variable profit leads to the shadow variabLe profit
function, which is denoted as
(6) irSa 115(P6,W51K,I,A).
Byapplying HoteUing's Leirma with respect to the shadow prices (see Diewert
11982]), short-run product supply and variable factor demand functions are
(7.1)y =tn;1(P5145K1A)
(7.2)v= -V11(P2,W51K,i,A).
These equations show that short-run production decisions depend on product
and variablefactor shadow prices, the Level and additions to the capital
stocks and the indicator of technology.
There a nuiiber of attractive features associated with the use of the
shadow variable profit function to empirically analyse non-competitive
behaviour in product and factor markets. First, non-competitive behaviour in
one market affects output supply and input demand functions relating to all
markets in which firms operate. Any one shadow price affects the complete
array of decisions on product supply and factor demand. Second, product
demand and factor supply functions do not have to be specified. Through the
shadow prices, non-competitive behaviour is parameterized by the elements of
the r and 0 matrIces.However, a difficulty with the use of the shadow
variable profit function is that both price and conjectural elasticities
cannot be identified.For example, without further information on price
elasticities, itis not possible to identify the nature of firm
interdependencies in product and factor markets. Nevertheless, the purpose
of this paper is not to investigate the various types of firm interactions,
but rather to determine whether firm decisions on product supply arid factor7
demand equate product prices to marginal costs and variabte factor prices to
marginal revenue products.6 If shadow prices differ from market prices in
product markets then product prices differ frommarginal costsof production.
In addition, if shadow prices differ from market prices in variable factor
markets then variable factor prices differ from marginal revenue products.
The second stage of production decisions pertains to the
determination of the demand for the capital stocks. The equilibriun
conditions relating to the capital stocks are determined by using the shadow
variable profit function (equation (6)) and the capital accunulation
equations (equation set (2)). In this stage the shadow flow of funds
(8) jflCt)=
K(5)C1m&)K(5 l)A(S)) 0T(5) CK(S)
(Im$)K(5l))]
Is maximized by selecting iC(s),s=t, .. .,. TheEuler equations for this stage
of the production probtem are
(9) E(s)l'Vfl (s#1)]
+oc(s,stl)' çfl! (s)-Wk(s)O
where Wk(s)cc(s,S+1Y1O(s)(ImS)E(s)QCs+1)ls the vector of rental rates.
Equation (9) poInts out that the expected marginal benefit of the capital
stocks equals the marginal capital Input cost. The marginal benefit consists
of two cofrçonents; the marginal profit and the reduction in marginal
adjustment cost due to the undepreciated capital stocks brought forward to
period s+1 from periods. The marginal capital input cost consists of two
coaçonents; •the rental rate and the marginal adjustment cost. Another way to8
view equation (9) is that the expected marginal benefit of the capitaL stocks
is equated to the respected shadow rental rates. These shadow rental rates
deviate from the market rental rates by marginal adjustment costs. If shadow
rental rates equal market rental rates then expected marginal profitabilities
equal market rental rates. In this situation firms are in long-run
equilibrium. The existence of marginal adjustment costs impLy that firms are
in the process of expanding (or reducing) their capital stocks. In addition,
from the first stage characterizing production decisions, firms also adjust
product supply and variable factor demands as capital stocks change.
Therefore marginal adjustment costs (or deviations between shadow and market
rental rates) signify that firms are in short-run equilibrium.
In capital input markets, as for the other markets under
consideration, shadow prices govern firm decisions. However, deviations of
shadow from market prices in product and variable factor markets are the
result of non-competitive behaviour, whiLe the price deviations in the
capitaL input markets result from the production technoLogy and reflect
short-run equilibrium. It is important to account for both non-competitive
behaviour and the type of equilibrium. The reason is that it is possible to
incorrectly infer that product market power exists in a situation where
prices are above long-run marginaL costs. Firms may be in short-run
equilibrium. Firms behaving competitively in the short-run set product
prices to short-run marginal costs. These costs exceed long-run marginal
costs because of the costs associated with capitat adjustment. The
equilibrium conditions (equations (6)j7) and (9)) admit the possibiLity of
testing hypotheses reLating to non-competitive behaviour and short-run
equilibrium. Indeed, by parameterizing the shadow variable profit function
and the relationships between market and shadow prices, hypothesis testing
can be undertaken.9
3. EstimaflonModel and Results
ThemodeL that is estimated consists of the equilibriun conditions
(equations (6)(7) and (9)). The data relate to timeseriesof variables
from Canadian mitt products (SIC 251) and pulpandpaper (SIC271)
industries.These two industries are selected because some interpretations
of the stylized facts suggest that firms producing mill products pay for
their wood inputs below the marginal revenue product earned through the use
of the input (see Constantino (1986] and U.S. international Trade Coumission
(1985]). while pulp and paper firms price their products above marginal cost
(see KLein (1985] and I4artinello 11985]. The two industries taken together
are the Largest manufacturing industries in Canada at the three digit SIC
level in terms of shipments and employment. In addition, these industries
are the major users of wood Inputs obtained from Canadian forests, which is
an important natural resource in the Canadian economy. The model is
• estimated for each of the two industries in order to investigate non-
competitive behaviour, in output and input markets.
A dynamic model is specified with capital adjustment costs so that
firms are not assuned to be in long-run equitibriun. The dynamic model is
• preferable to estimate in order to examine deviations from competitive
•
behaviour in product and factor markets and deviations from long-run
• equltibriun. The reason is that if the data are not consistent with long-run
equilibriun then the equality between shadow and market prices would be
rejected even if firms are acting competitively in the short-run.
The estimation of the model Is carried out using Industry data. In
other words, deviations between shadow and market prices are measured for
each of the industries. If all the firms in an industry equate shadow to
market prices then at the industry leveL these same equalities will be
satisfied. Hence unless firms exhibit non-competitive behaviour and incur
capital adjustment costs, the estimated model will not indicate inequalities10
betweenshadow andmarketprices.Hypothesis tests regarding deviations
betweenshadow andmarket prices do not test whether the product demand and
factorsupply curves facing the industry are horizontal, butwhether firms
decisions equate product prices to marginal costs, variabLe factor prices to
marginal revenue products and expected marginaL profits to rental rates. The
framework is usefuL in determining deviations between shadow and market
prices in product and factor markets.
In order.to estimate the equilibrium conditions a functional
form for the shadow variable profit function must be specified. It is
assumed that the function is transtog, (see Jorgenson (19861 and the
references cited therein) which is a flexible functional form.Using
equation set (5)




where P1= is shadow variable profit normalized by the price of energy
F' i=1,2,3 are the three output prices normalized by the energy price, P j4,5
are the prices of the wood and Labour inputs which are normalized by the
energy price, 1c0 1=1,2,3are the deviations between shadow and market
product prices, ('y are the elements in I' in equation (5.1)), 74)0 is the
deviation between the shadow and market factor price of wood (14 is the
nonzero etement in 0 in equation c5.2)), the shadow and market price
deviations for labour and energy are assumed to be zero. The deviations
between shadow and market prices are parameterized by 'i ial,...,4.711
liarginal adjustment cost is assumed to be zero when net investment
is zero so that fri long-run equilibrium there is no difference between the
shadow and market rentat rates for capital (see Berndt and Morrison [1981],
Mohnen, Nadiri and Prucha (1986]).Thus the adjustment cost function is
written as
(10.2) c5 =5$()2
where C5iscapital adjustment cost.8
From equation (10.1), the short-run equilibrium conditions (equations
(7.1) and (7.2)) can be written as
(11) s (1+'y)1[fl +E...1$1(nPJ1+ 'tj) t$ikK4$iaM
where s =P1y1/1i=1,2,3are the revenue shadow variable profit components
and i-Py3/?, j4,5 is the negative of the wood cost and labour cost
shadow variable profit components.Due to the parameterization of the
deviations between shadow and market prices, the short-run equilibrium
conditions are nonlinear in the parameters.9
To complete the characterization of the equilibriun, from equation
set (10), the Euler equation (9), is
(12) ECs) [ftlk+PkklnK(st1)4-7j$jklnP(s+1)(tli)+PkSlnA(st1)J
75(s+1)/K(st1)+C(s)ftJ((5+1)(1+r(5))fliX(s).Wk(5)O
where a(s,s+1Y1 =(1+r(s)),r is the discount rate. The parameter ft110
represents the short-run deviation between the shadow and market rental rates
for the capital input.12
In order to estimate equation set (10), (11) and (12), shadow
variabLe profit is replaced by TV(l+5p.s.)rtSwheres 1=1 S are
respectively the revenue and negative of the wood and labour cost variable
profit components. This means that the equilibrium conditions become
nonlinear in the variable profit components. Error terms are appended to
equation set (10) and (11) which reflect optimizing errors and technology
errors. The error term in equation (12) is a conditional expectation error
which arises when the conditional expectation of the future values of the
variables is replaced by their predicted values. The errors are assumed to
have zero expected value, and positive definite contemporaneous variance-
covariance matrix.In terms of equation (12), the zero expected value
assution means that expectations are rational.
The estimator used for equations (10), (11) and (12) is the
generalized method of moments estimator developed by Hansen (1982] and Hansen
and Singleton (19821. This estimator is equivaLent to the three stage Least
squares estimator if the random errors are conditionally homoscedastic (see
Pindyck and Rottembery [1982]). The endogenous variables in the estimation
modeL are variable profit, the five variable profit components (representing
the three products, wood and Labour inputs, and the capital Input.The
instrt.rental variables that are used are the Lagged capital stock, tagged
relative product, wood and labour prices and the time trend.1°
The model is estimated for the milL products industry and the pulp
and paper industry. The model is estimated for each industry first with 11<0,
I=l,...3, 14>0. The estimation allows for non-competitive behaviour in the
three product and wood input markets. wext the model is estimated for non-
competitive behaviour in the product markets alone and then for non-
competitive behaviour in the wood input market alone. Lastly the model is
estimated with competitive behaviour in the product and wood input markets.13
In order to test for the constancy of the -yparametersthe sample is
split in 1972. This year corresponds to about the midpoint in the sample and
tothe major oil shock experienced in the Canadian economy. With respect to
the mitt products industry, estimating the system of equations altowing for
both non-competitive behaviour, that is -yptc, and two different sets of the
'y parameters, yields a vatue of the objective function of 64.465.(The
objective function is the minimized weighted sun of squares of the errors for
the system of equations). Constraining the 'y parameters to be constant over
the sample yields an objective function value of 65.422. Thus the test
statistic is 0.957 which has a chi-square distribution. The critical value
of the distribution with 4 degrees of freedom (where 4 is the nunber of
restrictions) is x2o.osg9.488. Thus the null hypothesis that there is no
difference in the parameters over the sample period cannot be rejected.
indeed, a similar result is obtained when 14=0 white yitO 11,2,3. in this
case non-competltve behaviour in the product markets is investigated along
with shifts in the values of the 'y i1,2,3 parameters. In this situation the
values of the objective function are 64.549 (unconstrained irl,2,3) and
65.681 constrained). Clearly, in this case of non-competitive pricing in
product markets the null hypothesis of no changes in theparametersover
the sample cannot be rejected.
This conclusion for the mill products Industry is quite strong and,
in fact, carries over to the pulp and paper industry. The values of the
objective function when alt of the parameters are estimated are 62.914
(unconstrained), and 66.925 (constrained), in the case with non-competitive
behaviour in product markets, so thati1,2,3are estimated, the objective
function values are 65.009 (unconstrained), and 67.385 (constrained).
The reason for the conclusion that there are no differences in the
i parameters over the sample period in the mill products and pulp and paper14
industries is that these parameters are not statistically different from
zero. In other words, the millproducts and pulpand paper industriesprice
competitivelyin all three product markets and the wood input markets. This
result can be seen from table 1. Table I shows the values of the objective
functions and the test statistics relating to the parameter restrictions
concerning shadow and market price deviations, when the parameters are
constant over the sample. The test statistic is distributed as a chi-square.
Clearly the non-competitive model nests both the competitive model and the
partially non-competitive models.
The null hypothesis relates to •the competitive model arid the
alternative is defined by the non-competitive model. The values of the test
statistic from table 1 are less than the critical values for the mill
products andpulpand paper industries. Therefore the hypothesis of
competitive behaviour In the three product and wood input markets cannot be
rejected. Moreover, although by the nesting of the models all partial non-
competitive behaviour is rejected, it is instructive to see in table 1 how
little the values of the objective function change as more competitive
behaviour is imposed in the two industries.
The estimation results for the competitive model are presented In
table 2 for both industries.
'V15
TabLe 1: Testsof lion-CompetitiveBehaviour in Product
a.4 Wood lrçut Markets
KiltsProducts PulperdPaper
Restrictionst Objective** Statistic*** Objective Statistic
Non-Competitive N.A. 65.422 N.A. 66.925 H.A.
ProductandUood
lion-Competitive 1 65.681 0.259 67.385 0.460
Product,
CompetitiveWood
Competitive 3 65.946 0.524 68.028 1.103
Product, Non-
Cocrpetltlve Wood
CompetitIve 4 66.775 1.353 69.599 2.774
Product,
Competitive Wood
* Therestrictions refer to the nunberofparameter restrictions.
Theobjectivefunction Is the minimized value of the weighted sun of
squares of the
errors for the system of equations.
*** Thetest statistic is the difference in the objective function values
between the unrestricted
andrestrictedmodels.16
The standard errors of the estimates are small relative to the parameter
estimates. The standard errors of each of the equations are also relativeLy
small, in addition, residual plots showed that there is no seriaL
correLation. The estimates for each industry generated positive variabLe
profit, capital input and variable profit components at each point in the
sample for both industries. The variable profit function is also convex in
the product and variabLe factor prices at each point in the sample for both
industries.11
The estimates of fl found in tabLe 2 for the mitt products and pulp
and paper industry show that the industries are not in long-run equilibrium.
The estimate of the adjustment cost parameter is positive and statistically
different from zero.Indeed, with respect to the capital input there are
significant marginaL adjustment costs so that the shadow rental rate exceeds
the market rental rate on capitaL. Table 3 shows the deviation between the
shadow and market rental rates. The wedge is defined by the ratio of the
marginal adjustment cost to the market rental rate. If the ratio is zero
then the expected marginal profit of capital equals the market rentaL rate
and there Is no short-run deviation between shadow and market rental rates.
On average for every Si spent on capital services the marginal profit on
capitaL exceeds the rental rate by $0.10 and $0.17 respectively in the mill
products and pulp and paper industry. The shadow rental rate deviates from
themarket rentaL rate in the pulp andpaper industry by about twice the
magnitudefound in mill products. Indeed, by inspection from table 3ofthe
minimumand maximum deviations, the relative differences between the two
industries is consistent over the sample period.
Therefore, the estimation results point out that there are no
differences between product prices and marginal costs and between wood input
prices and marginal revenue products in the Canadian miLL products and puLp
and paper industries.In addition, these industries are not in long-run17
Table2: EstimationResultsCoupetitiveModel
MiLL Products Pulp arxl P
Parameter Estimate Standard ErrorEstimate Standard Error
P0 1.135 0.995 1065.575 226.270
flu 2.419 0.411 -43.548 14.373
P2 0.645 0.596 E-01 -40.864 8.182
P3 -0.780 0.202 35.968 8.559
P4 -1.686 0.429 34.244 9.672
-0.976 E-0l 0.193 33.417 7.566
Pk 0.387 0.293 -138.311 29.691
0.683 £01 0.787 E02 3.818 1.072
ft11 -0.459 0.164 0.813 0.946
P22 0.111 0.259 C-Cl 0.620 0.300
0.775 0.534 F-Cl 1.332 0.307
p44 0.119 0.106 -0.560 0.441
p55 -0.213 0.315 C-Cl -0.490 0.335
Pkk -0.153 0.443 E-01 -9.074 1.947
Pea -0.148C-01 0.259 E-01
p12 -0.957 0.332 E-01 -0.761 0.321
/14 0.132 0.128 0.479 0.607
P15 0.40? 0.513 C-Cl 0.335 0.402
P1k -0.903E-01 0.573 C-Cl 3.032 0.934
Pie
-0.143 0.299 C-Cl
-0.124 C-UI 0.310 F-01 0.423 0.223
P25 0.906E-03 0.178 E-01 -1.115 0.234
P2k -0.763 0.104 E-01 2.785 0.540
P2a -0.818C-UI 0.223 F-UI
p34 -0.385 0.294 C-Ui -0.520 0.159
p35 -0.319 0.302 E-01 -0.119 0.192
flak 0.220 0.300 C01 2.410 0.563
PSa -0.623E01 0.206 C-Ui
P45 0.108 0.396 C-Cl 0.443 E-02 0.266
P4k 0.916 C-Cl 0.615 C-Ui -2.350 0.630
-0.138 E-01 0.184 C02 0.935 F-Ui 0.218 C-Cl
-0.548 E-01 0.276 C-Cl -2.284 0.492
P5rs 0.902E02 0.168 C02 0.861 E01 0.161 E'Ol
0.231 0.688C01
Pjj 0.173E-03 0.692 E-04 0.848 C-C? 0.348 E-0118
TabLe2 (continued)
Equation Standard Error StandardError
VariableProfit 0.182 0.133
First Product 0.149 0.209
SecondProduct 0.140 E-O1 0.369
Third Product 0.655 E-01 0.258
VoodInput 0.141 0.314
Labour Input 0.711E01 0.353
capital Input 0.894(-01 0.691 E0119
TabLe3: Deviation Between Shadow aM Market Rental Rates
onCapital; p11aiciwk





equilibriumas there are significant marginaL costs of adjustment that cause
the marginaL profitability of capital to exceed the rentaL rate in each
industry.Thus the Industries behave competitively in the short-run.
Specifically, with respect to product markets, prices are equal to marginal
costs. However, these costs are inclusive of marginal adjustment costs, and
thereforeexceed apparent marginal costs derived under the mistaken
assumption that the industries are in Long-run equiLibriua.
4. Returns to Scale and Rates of Technoloqicat Chanqe
Previous estimates of returns to scaLe in the milL products end pulp
and paper industries in both the ILS. and Canada find that there are scale
economies (see Constantino [19861 and Mart inelto (1985] for surveys of these
results). However, scale economies are inconsistent with competitive pricing
behaviour In product and factor markets and Long-run equilibrium. The
results in this paper show that competitive pricing cannot be rejected but
simultaneously the industries are not in Long-run equilibrium. Hence the
issue remains open as to the extent, if any, of scale economies when both
industries are In short-run equilibrium as a result of capital adjustment
costs.
Caves, Christensen and Swanson [1951] deveLoped a measure of returns
to scale within a muttiproduct framework with the marginal benefit of capital
not equated to the rental rate and with exogenous outputs. This measure was
based on the variable cost function. Output endogeneity necessitates that a
measure of returns to scale be developed which is based on the variabLe
profit function.
To develop this measure consider the definition of returns to scale
based on the transformation function Cl),
(13) Py- ()iTvi+zlTkKk)/%lTJYj.In equilibriun AT1
-tJ1=1,..., n; AT =PJrl,...,t alnTIOLnXk=-
whereA is the Lagrangian multiplier. Substituting these
equalities into the right side of equation (13) yields
(14) Py = cz?risi4zT=plnu"IolnKk/41sp
where s =WIv/ri=1,...,n,sr Pjyj/T"J11...,t which are the variable input
cost and revenue components of variable profit.12 The estimates of returns
to scale are presented in table 4. there are small scale economies in the
mill products and pulp and paper industries. On average scaLe is around 1.15
in both industries and the estimates are very stable through the sample
period. Thus in short-run equilibrium there are small scale economies along
with competitive pricing in product and variable factor markets.
ALong with scale economies, the rate of technological change affects
the profitability of an industry.Previous estimates of the rate of
technological change for mill products and pulp and paper industries in
Canada and the U.S. have been found under long-run equilibrium conditions.
The rejection of Long-run equilibrium implies that previous estimates of the
rate of technological change may be biased. Indeed, this may be the case as
previous estimates found negative rates of technological change in the two
industries over long periods of time.
In general there are two measures of the rate of technological
change; an output based measure and an input based measure (see Caves1
ChristensenandSwanson (19811). In the context of multiple output
endogeneity and short-run equilibrium, based on the variable profit function1
the two measures can be derived from the transformation function (1). The
output based measure relates the cotmuon output growth rate to technological
change, giventhe levels of all inputs. It is defined as22
(15) =Ti4Ty
where t =InAis the indicator of the Level of technology. Translating this
formula in terms of the variable profit function, and noting that olru'Vjt =-
It/tv,
(16) = (olntV,Ot)/Els
Table 4 shows that the output based measure of the rate of technological Is
positive for both industries throughout the sampLe period. In the mill
products and pulp and paper industries, the common output growth rate
averages around 2.8 and 3.3percent per annum respectively as a result of
technological change. Indeed, in these two industries technotogicat change
exerts a greater effect on outpu.t growth relative to the effect of
technological change found in other major Canadian manufacturing industries
(see Bernstein and Mohnen 119911).
The input based measure of technological change is defined as the
common rate of Input contraction due to technolo9icaL change, given the
Levels of all outputs. Thus from the transformation function (9,13
(17)Zv = Tt/(tiTv+ T=1TkKk)
and in terms of the variabLe profit function
(18)z= (oln?,et)/(4..js+ E=pLniv8lnKk).
CLearly, from equations (14), (16) and (18),the two measures of the rate of
technological change are equal when there is constant returns to scale, since23
Table 4: Returns to Scale andRatesof Technological Change
MIII Products PutparxlPaper
F)' Sr 15, 5'
Mean 1.142 0.0280.025 1.1490.033 0.030
Std. deviatIon 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.1060.0130.015
t4ininun 1.1100.0210.023 0.945 0.0160.012
Ilaxitnun 1.174 0.030 0.026 1.3430.061 0.06424
=z,,/z,,,.however, because there are scale economies then z.,cz>,. This
result is found in tabLe 4. In the mitt products and puLp and paper
industries, on average the input based rate of technological change is 2.5
and 3.0 per cent per annum respectivety. As for the output based rates of
technologicat change, the input based rates are relativeLy constant over the
sample period. The results on the rate of technoLogical change differ from
other studies. Generally negative rates of technological change are
estimated for the mitt products industry (see Martinelto t1985] for Canada,
Jorgenson-Franmeni [19361 for the U.S. and Jorgenson et at (19901 for the
U.S. and Japan). These estimates are found undertheassumption of zero
adjustment costs so that the mitt products industry is in tong-run
equiLibrium. In addition, also within a long-run equilibrium context,
Martirtetto estimated that there is a negative rate of technological change
for Canadian pulp and paper. The rejection of the assumption of tong-run
equilibrium, and therefore the rejection of zero adjustment costs, leads to
the result that the rates of technological change are positive for both
Canadian industries in short-run equilibrium.
5. ConcLusion
A dynamic model with multipLe products incorporating non-coapetitive
behaviour in both product and factor markets was estimated for the Canadian
mitt products and pulp and paper industries. Deviations between shadow and
market prices were parameterized and it was found that in both industries
competitive behaviour occurs in both sets of markets.
The dynamic nature of the model arises from the existence of
adjustment costs associated with the capital input. Adjustment costs cause
deviations from long-run equilibrium. Indeed, it was estimated that the mitt
products and putp and paper industries are in short-run equltibriuTi.
Adjustment costs at the margin create a wedge between the marginal prof it of25
capital and the rental rate.It was estimated that the marginal profit of
capital is almost 20 per cent greater than the rental rate in the pulp and
paper industry and the wedge is about 10 per cent in the mitt products
industry.
Competitive behaviour in short-run equilibritn was found to be
coincident with scale economies in both the pulp and paper and mill products
industries.It was estimated that there are slightly increasing returns to
scale at around 1.15. Technological change also occurred within the context
of competitive behaviour and short-run equilibrium. In fact, unlike other
studies which did not account for competitive product markets or capital
adjustment costs, it was estimated that there are positive rates of
technological change for both industries. The rates were very stable and
averaged around 2.5 and 3.0 per cent per annun respectively for the mill
products and pulp and paper industries.
There are different types of extensions to the research outlined in
this paper. First, the model can be applied to different iridustriea and to
firms within an industry.second, the parameterization of the deviation
between shadow and market prices in multiple product-multipLe factor contexts
could depend on the sumnary statistics of product demand and factor supply
(see Baker and Bresnahan (1985fl. In this way, for multiple product
industries that do exhibit product and factor market power, it becomes
possible to see how market power changes over time.26
Data Appendix
The data for the miLl products and pulp and paper industry are
obtained from Statistics Canada, the saspte period is 1963-1987. With
respect to miLL products, three products are considered, softwood litter,
hardwood Luther, arid other Lumber (namely shakes, shingles arid wood chips).
Output data is obtained from Statistics Canada CataLogues 35-204 and 65-202.
Output quantities are shipments and output prices are defined as revenues
divided by quantities.
There are three variable factors, labour, wood and energy. The data
on the variable factors are obtained from Statistics Canada cataLogue 35-204.
Labour quantity is hours paid and the Labour Input price is defined as Labour
cost (wages, salaries and supplementary payments) divided by labour Input
quantity. The wood quantity Is the wood used by sawmilLs and pLanning mills
arid the wood price is the cost of wood used divided by wood input quantity.
The energy input quantity and price is based on a Tornqvlst Index of
eLectricity, fuel oIL, gasoLine and natural gas used by sawmiLls and pLanning
mills.
The quasi-fixed factor is a Tornqvist index of buiLdings and
construction capital, and machinery and equipment capital. Statistics Canada
provided the unpubLished capital stock data which consist of gross and net
end of year stocks in current and constant dollars. The capital purchase
prices are defined as the ratio of current to constant dollar gross stocks.
In order to generate the rental rate on capital, the corporate income tax,
the investment tax credit and the capital cost aLlowance rates are obtained
from the Canada Gazette and Statistics Canada cataLogue 13-211. In addition,
the discount rate is taken to be the annual average of monthly average yields
of Government of Canada bonds with 10 or more years of maturity. The
discount rate is obtained from the Bank of Canada Review.
With respect to puLp and paper, there are three outputs, newsprint,27
pulpendother paper products (namely book and writing paper, tissue,
wrapping paper, building paper and paperboard). Output data is obtained from
statistics CanadacataLogue36-204. Output quantities are shipments and
output prices are defined as revenues divided by quantities.
There are three variabte factors, Labour, wood and energy. The data
on the variable factors are obtained from catalogue 36-204. The variable
factors are defined in the same manner as for the mill products industry.
The quasi-fixed factor Is defined in the same manner as for mitt products.
The data is obtained from 56-506, 57-208k and from unpublished Statistics
Canida sources. Lastly the rentaL rate on capital is defined in the same way
as in the mill products industry and the various tax and interest rates are
obtained from the same sources. The technology indicator is the time trend.28
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1. Bernstein and Mohnen 11991] atually conduct a test between short and
long-run equilibrium.
2. It is assumed that the service flow of a quasi-fixed input is
proportional to it's stock.
3. The notation (t) is generally omitted for simplicity.
4. For an oligopolistic industry in short-run equilibrium producing a
single product in competitive factor markets, the first order
approximation to variable profit for the representative firm is,
[H(Yt)Yfl +Hcy*))y
-wTv_H(Y5)YtyC2
where Y is industry output, II is the inverse product demand function
and the superscript e represents short-run equilibrium. The last
term in the variable profit expression represents additional profit
relative to the competitive Level that the firm earns from oligopoly
power Defining yeye/ye = asthe short-run conjectural elasticity
and fi (ye)ye/pe= 'asthe inverse price elasticity of product demand
in short-run equilibrium, the shadow product price is P5 =PCI+
E5)- (Notice that the elasticities are evaluated at the
equilibriummagnitudes,see Ceroski (1982] and Roberts (1984].) The
maximization of variable profit is euivlent to the maximization of
shadow variable profit, which is P5y -Wv,since the shadow product
price is marginal revenue.
5. Roberts (1984) focuses on different types of oligopoly models and
therefore he specifies aLternative types of conjectural variations.
As a consequence, he assumes that all firms are price-takers in
factor markets and the price eLasticity of product demand is constant
and exogenously given. In our context this means that 0 0 and the
elements of1' represent known multiples of the conjectural
elasticities.
6. An alternative approach to investigate non-competitive behaviour in
product markets using duality theory is through the cost and the
inverse product demand functions (see Appelbaun (1979, 1982],
AppeLbaun and Kohli (19791, Bernstein and Mohnen (19913).
7. An alternative interpretation of 'y, i1, .,4are deviations between
shadow and market relative prices (that is prices relative to the
energy price).
8. Equations (10.1) and (10.2) can be combined into a single function
with just a renormalization of jto reflect the fact that the shadow
variable function is defined In terms of the natural logarithms of
the variables. Shadow variable profit is now gross of adjustment
cost.29
9. The energy cost component equation can be eliminatedbythe
sumnability condition, since z1qki+ lj)=I-4 where4= -
P6y6/i2,P6 is the energy price andy6is the energy quantity.
10. The adjustment cost function is not estimated as a separate equation
since parameter uisin the equiLibriun condition for the capitaL
input.Inaddition, the model(equations(10.1), (11) and (12)) are
estimated as a set of implicit equations using the Tine series
Processor software under the nonlinear three stage (east squares
procedure.In addition, the instrunents are the standard ones
selected in this context (see Pindyck and Rotemberg (1982]). other
instrunents such as ,theLagged defLator for gross domestic product,
theLagged wage rate for the manufacturing sector and a moving
average of interest rates for Long term government bonds were used
in the estimation. The main conclusions of the paper, in terms of
non-competitive behaviour and capital adjustment, were unaffected.
The data are described in the data appendix.
11. A form of separability is imposed on the estimation in both
industries between the other product category (output nuiter three)
and products one and two. The other product category is relatively
more heterogenous, so 0 is imposed.
12. If the deviations between shadow and market prices are not found to
be zero then the revenue and variable cost components in equation
(14) are in terms of shadow variable profit and the marginaL profit
of capital is also in terms of shadow variabLe profit.
13. The two measures of the rate of technological change can be modified
when market prices differ from shadow prices. In equations (16) and
(18) the shadow variable profit function is used and the profit
components are in terms of shadow variabLe profit.30
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